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Abstract 
This article is about the effect of local tailored interventions to counter (violent) extremism, and 
therefore contributes to the academic and policy debates. It focusses on local, professional 
perspectives on person-specific interventions utilising a Dutch case study as the basis. The 
interventions are part of the wider-ranging counter terrorism policy that entails (local) measures that 
are deployed in relation to designated high-risk individuals and groups. By reviewing policy 
documents and conducting semi-structured interviews, the exploratory study concludes that the key 
factors for a hand-tailored intervention are a solid network, expert knowledge to assess potential signs 
of extremist ideology, an awareness of not having too many concurrent measures, good inter-
institutional cooperation and information-sharing. The professionals involved felt that person-specific 
interventions have contributed to reducing the threat of religious extremism in the Netherlands. 
Nonetheless, municipal officials and security agents emphasised the importance of setting realistic 
goals and a focus on preventive rather than repressive measures. Furthermore, despite the central role 
that municipal actors play, they run up against problems such as cooperation within the security and 
care sector. National entities appear to emphasize information-gathering and monitoring more than 
community-focused cooperation. Thereby questioning whether, on the national level, local 
professionals are perceived as playing a key role in dealing with extremism. 
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Introduction 
 
In response to recent national security threats, European countries have devised local policies 
to intensify counter-terrorism and violent extremism efforts. This has been undertaken to 
complement increased efforts to protect the rule of law and bring to justice those accused of 
crimes of terrorism. Many states have widened and strengthened the powers of the criminal 
justice system and administrative authorities, and including in some cases the powers of the 
intelligence and security services. Relevant legislation has also been tightened-up to facilitate 
the counterterrorism effort (Coolsaet 2010/2011; Vermeulen 2014). Countries including the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have invested in local activities 
designed to prevent and tackle terrorism. It is assumed that those professionals working at the 
municipal level, more than anyone else, may pick up signs of possible extremism and are 
most likely to have access to relevant communities.  
Therefore great efforts are being made to share intelligence, at an international level, 
but also locally to enable relevant security - and social professionals to have the information 
they need (Waxman 2008) presumably to help prevent acts of terrorism. This form of 
countering (violent) extremism falls under the so-called ‘community-targeted approach’, 
where the emphasis is on intelligence-gathering and monitoring society (Spalek 2012; 
Thomas 2010). Various others (violent) extremism prevention programmes have been set up 
in and beyond Europe for the based on the ‘community-focused approach’ (Horgan & 
Braddock 2010; Koehler 2016; Mastroe & Szmania 2016). This approach is largely geared 
towards cooperation between public authorities and communities, taking account of the 
complexity relating to ethnicity, politics, religion, and the local context (Spalek 2012). 
Despite these developments recent research has concluded that it is not, as yet, possible to 
determine the effects of, amongst others, the local approach to countering terrorism or 
(violent) extremism in the Netherlands (Noordegraaf, Douglas, Bos & Klem 2016). 
Consequently, it is currently clear that the effects of the local, person-specific approach in the 
Netherlands cannot be determined.  
Furthermore, international studies have suggested that there are few empirical data 
available about the effect of countering violent radicalisation or disengagement programmes 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan & Braddock 2010; Koehler 2016; Williams, Horgan & 
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Evans 2016). In other words, specific measures may or may not convince (potential) 
extremists to discontinue their actions. Additionally, there is very likely no direct, objective, 
way to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism or countering (violent) extremism policy 
(Vidino & Brandon 2012). This is probably because that policy consists of a multiplicity of 
interventions and instruments deployed by different partner organisations. Moreover, the 
context may differ significantly per community. Also, it is possible for effects envisaged by 
policymakers to be produced as a result of other causes (Horgan & Braddock 2010; Mastroe 
& Szmania 2016; Noordegraaf et al. 2016). Last but not least, countering terrorism as well as 
(violent) extremism is a subject that has scarcely figured to date as the subject of thorough 
empirical research (Crenshaw 2000; Koehler 2016; Lum, Kennedy & Sherley 2006; Mastroe 
& Szmania, 2016; Schmid 2013; Schuurman & Eijkman 2013; Silke 2001). For all these 
reasons, it is not easy to establish a causal relationship between particular effects and 
particular interventions at the local level. 
This article discusses person-specific interventions to counter extremism (primarily 
religious extremism) on the basis of the case study of local professionals in the Netherlands. 
In section two we reflect on the methodology and methods of this exploratory study, and in 
section three we briefly introduce the Dutch counter-terrorism approach. This is followed by 
an analysis of person-specific interventions and the way they are implemented. In section six 
and seven the local professional perspective on preventive - and repressive hand-tailored 
measures as well as the continuous learning curve in devising them is debated. This is 
followed by a reflection on the sides-effects of the actual interventions. Finally, points for 
further discussion are set out in the conclusion. 
 
Methodology & Methods 
 
This exploratory study focuses on the local integrated approach from the vantage point of the 
professionals whose task it is to implement it. We assess the way the person-specific approach 
is envisaged by central government and ask how municipal authorities actually implement it 
in practice. In addition to this we also assess what the effects of the person-specific 
intervention are, as experienced by local professionals. The Netherlands was chosen as a case 
study, because one of the characteristic features of the Dutch counter-terrorism and (violent) 
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policy extremism is its focus on the preventive role of local authorities (National Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) 2014a/b, 2016a). The role of municipal authorities 
is particularly important in dealing with (violent) radicalisation in society, as well as in 
preventing and/or altering the actions, and sometimes the ideas, of known or potential 
extremists. Consequently, in view of these policy and academic public debates on the role of 
local professionals in preventing terrorist activity and violent extremism in Europe, this 
article, focusses on their experiences with so-called person-specific interventions and the 
(side-)effects. 
We opted for a qualitative methodological approach in responding to these research 
questions. Two different research methods were employed: policy document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews. The policy documents assisted us primarily in reconstructing the 
local integrated approach, including the hand-tailored interventions. In September and 
October 2016 we conducted ten interviews in the eastern, southern and western regions of the 
Netherlands. They were conducted in seven different municipalities. Each respondent was a 
public official with experience in implementing the person-specific approach. The central 
questions in these semi-structured interviews were: How have, ‘you’ (the respondent) 
implemented the person-specific approach in your municipality? And, what effects have you 
noted?  
Seven interviewees were municipal officials in charge of coordinating the local 
integrated approach within their municipality. Two of these municipalities are large with a so-
called ‘priority’ designation,3 while three are somewhat smaller but close to ‘priority’ areas.4 
We also interviewed two municipal officials from a region with apparently few problems and 
no ‘priority’ municipalities. One of these large municipalities had a substantial multicultural 
population,5 while the other was smaller.6 In addition, we interviewed representatives of 
partner organisations such as a policy adviser for the Public Prosecution Service (OM), 7 and a 
process manager and an information analyst for a Community Safety Partnership 
                                                 
3 The two respondents from ‘priority’ municipalities are referred to here as municipal officials 1 and 2. 
4 These respondents are referred to here as municipal officials 3, 4 and 5. 
5 This respondent is referred to here as municipal official 7. 
6 This respondent is referred to here as municipal official 6. 
7 This respondent is referred to here as the OM policy officer. 
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(Veiligheidshuis; CSP),8 both of which organisations operate in priority regions. Finally, we 
interviewed a police officer in the Counterterrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation unit 
(CTER),9 in a region that does not have any priority municipalities.  
Nine of the ten interviews were conducted in person and one by telephone. Each 
interview was transcribed and coded. We used an inductive (‘grounded theory’) approach for 
analysing the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967). We commenced with a few initial codes based on 
different topics used in our interview questions (local problems with radicalization and 
extremism, organization of the local approach, interventions and access to justice). While 
coding and analysing these transcriptions we added codes based on repeating and meaningful 
themes within the a priori topics, and frequently consulted the literature to find relevant 
theoretical frameworks. By using an inductive approach we allowed categories to flow from 
the data and new insights to emerge (Glaser, 2002). Interview quotes were translated from 
Dutch into English.  
 
The Dutch counter-terrorism approach 
 
The ‘broad approach’ that characterises the Netherlands’ counterterrorism policy is in line 
with international strategies for combating terrorism and violent extremism, such as the 
European Union’s counterterrorism strategy (Council of the EU 2005) and that of the United 
Nations (UN 2006). These strategies are geared towards prevention, protection, pursuit, and 
response, and are therefore intended to constitute an integrated approach to countering the 
threat of terrorism. This ‘broad’ or ‘integrated’ approach was laid down in the National 
Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020 (NCTV 2016a) and builds on the National 
Counterterrorism Strategy for 2011-2015. This in turn originated from the government-wide 
National Security Strategy (V&J 2007) and the foreign ministry’s International Security 
Strategy (BuZa 2013). Furthermore, the Dutch approach involves a combination of preventive 
(‘soft’) and reactive (‘hard’) measures. The latter are geared towards identifying, monitoring 
and combating terrorism and extremism, especially religious extremism, while ‘soft’ or 
‘preventive’ measures are geared towards promoting social cohesiveness, the integration of 
                                                 
8 The process manager is referred to here as CSP employee 1 and the information analyst is referred to as CSP 
employee 2. 
9 This respondent is referred to here as the police officer. 
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minorities, as well as tackling discrimination (De Graaf & De Graaff 2008; De Graaf & 
Eijkman 2011; De Graaf & Eijkman 2011). The local integrated approach, including the hand-
tailored interventions, is just one aspect of this broader effort.  
Recently, the Minister of Security & Justice (V&J) promised the Dutch House of 
Representatives, in its consultations with the permanent committee on matters relating to the 
intelligence and security services, to draw up a plan of action to tackle jihadism. This led, in 
August 2014, to the publication of a plan of action entitled ‘An Integrated Approach to 
Jihadism’ (AIJ) (Ministry of Security & Justice and Ministry of Social Affairs & Employment 
2014). The AIJ sets out 38 measures, some pre-existing, others enhanced or new, that can be 
deployed as part of the integrated approach to violent jihadism. They focus on five policy 
lines: reducing the risk of people travelling from the Netherlands to conflict zones to wage 
jihad; interventions to stop those trying to travel to conflict zones; tackling radicalisation and 
social tension; social media and information-sharing; and cooperation (NCTV 2014a). The 
plan of action consists of criminal-law, administrative, and other preventive measures for use 
by a range of local partner organisations.  
Municipal authorities play a key, coordinating, role in the Dutch counter-terrorism 
approach, primarily, because at the local level those concerned are assumed to have insight 
into the social context and are in a position to notice changes amongst young people or adults 
(Kop & Moors 2015; Witte 2015). Before municipal authorities launch interventions, it is 
essential for them to prepare the ground by setting up local structures, finding partners for 
cooperation, and developing their knowledge of the problem. Possible signs of extremism and 
radicalisation are discussed in multidisciplinary case conferences. Where necessary, specific 
individuals or groups that are deemed to pose a risk are targeted in interventions involving the 
cooperation of various partner organisations with the municipal authority adopting a 
coordinating role. Effective networks are a prerequisite for information-sharing, so building 
up networks around the problem of violent extremism is essential. These networks are broader 
than the security partners in the approach (e.g. (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
and Security (NCTV), the police and the Public Prosecution Service) and should include 
primary healthcare workers, key figures, and other members of the community who are 
involved in preventing violent extremism.  
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Finally, local professionals are assumed to possess a certain amount of knowledge and 
expertise to be capable of detecting and interpreting signs of radicalisation and of setting up 
hand-tailored interventions. A number of training courses are available for this purpose. After 
this preparatory phase of knowledge development and training, the guidelines, which the 
NCTV (2014b) developed to help municipal authorities to improve their own counter 
(violent) extremism measures. However, as recognized in research it is impossible to create a 
single, specific profile with points that are indicative of (violent) extremism, since so much 
depends on the context (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Horgan 2010; Schmid 2013; Schuurman & 
Eijkman 2015). 
 To prevent and combat such processes, municipal authorities are advised to 
concentrate on weakening the breeding ground for (violent) extremism and on strengthening 
the resilience of young people in relation to radical ideas and influence. It is important to 
focus this preventive approach on the small group that is vulnerable to extremist ideas - and 
not, in other words, on entire sections of the population on the basis of shared characteristics 
(NCTV 2014b). Together with key figures in the environment of those belonging to this small 
group (such as their family and friends, teachers and sports coaches, spiritual leaders or local 
entrepreneurs), professionals working on the front line can help to discourage extremism from 
taking root. They can provide opposing views and offer alternatives to terrorist and extremist 
manipulations, to prevent those concerned from becoming radicalised.  
The governmental guidelines also discuss de-radicalisation: the process of halting or 
reversing radicalisation once a person has already become radicalised. A distinction is drawn 
between ‘disengagement’ from the extremist sphere of influence and ‘real de-radicalisation’, 
which means renouncing extremist ideology. This distinction between disengagement and de-
radicalisation is also found in the literature (Barrelle 2015; Bjørgo & Horgan 2013; Dalgaard-
Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2009/2010; Koehler 2016; Schmid 2013). In these academic studies, 
‘disengagement’ is regarded as distancing oneself from the violent, terrorist modus operandi 
in one’s behaviour, whereas ‘de-radicalisation’ implies an actual change in a person’s views 
(Schmid 2013). According to the literature and central government, disengagement is more 
achievable than ‘real de-radicalisation’ as a result of governmental effort (Barrelle 2015; 
Bjørgo & Horgan 2013; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2010; NCTV 2014b). Supervising a 
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person in an organised structure may help to detach the person from the extremist sphere of 
influence.  
  
Person-specific interventions 
 
If individuals carry out terrorist activities, the local authority may have to deal with criminal 
investigations of terrorism and the arrest of suspects within their municipality. In the Dutch 
context criminal investigations of terrorist or violent extremist activity are a matter for the 
Public Prosecution Service and the police. However, the municipal authority and other 
partners also play a role by reporting any actions that may indicate preparations for (violent) 
extremist activities. As studies about religious extremists and foreign fighters suggest the 
threat of a terrorist attack has been present in the Netherlands for more than a decade (Bakker 
& de Bont 2016; Bie, de, de Poot & van der Leun, 2015; Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie 
2008; Van San 2015; Schuurman & Bakker 2015; Schuurman, Eijkman & Bakker 2015; 
Weggemans, Bakker & Grol 2014). Therefore, any signs of violent terrorism or terrorist 
action, may put the local authorities under severe pressure.  
Once the nature of the terrorist threat is in the public order domain, it falls under the 
responsibility of the mayor. He or she must put adequate security measures in place to prevent 
criminal offences or public order disturbances (NCTV 2014a/b). If an act of terrorism has 
been committed, the government’s actions must focus on helping the victims, maintaining 
public order, finding the perpetrators, and taking action in terms of possible follow-up attacks. 
For person-specific interventions, the national government advises local authorities to set up a 
multidisciplinary case conference with partner organisations. Good cooperation and 
information-sharing within the multidisciplinary case conferences are deemed essential 
(NCTV 2014b). Signs of radicalisation, jihadist travel, and the return of religious extremists 
from conflict regions are discussed concurrently within the multidisciplinary case conference.  
The participants in the multidisciplinary case conference are municipal officials and 
representatives of the local authority, police, Public Prosecution Service, the Probation 
Service, youth care services, the child protection board, and youth workers, with the 
municipal authority acting in a coordinating role (Association of Netherlands Municipalities 
2015). Tailoring each response to the particular person and situation is crucial. The action 
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taken will often involve a combination of monitoring, criminal-law and administrative 
measures, and/or a form of supervision. The person-specific intervention strategy will vary in 
form, degree of coercion, and intensity from one case to the next. Those returning from a 
conflict zone will be subjected to a criminal investigation by the Public Prosecution Service, 
which will look at the reason for the person’s travel and ascertain whether the person has 
committed one or more criminal acts. The local authority may also decide to impose 
administrative measures on those returning from a conflict zone, such as revoking their 
passport or discontinuing benefits or student finance.  
In setting up the multidisciplinary case conference, knowledge and support can be 
drawn from existing national - and local structures, such as the Community Safety Partnership 
(CSP) or other existing consultative bodies dealing with specific target groups. Alternatively, 
a separate working group may be set up, if the problem calls for it. The mayor may discuss 
the chosen intervention strategy in the local ‘tripartite group’ (involving representatives of the 
police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the local authority). Then the chosen interventions 
are applied by the various agencies concerned. Over the past few years, the NCTV and the 
General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) have provided support to priority 
municipalities to help them put the local integrated approach into practice. They do so by 
notifying mayors at regular intervals about the developments within municipalities, helping 
authorities to set up case conferences, and facilitating a monthly exchange of information 
between the most relevant municipal authorities, the NCTV, and the AIVD (NCTV 2014b). 
Nonetheless, as evidenced by research, municipal authorities sometimes complain that in 
practice they are not kept sufficiently informed. One example cited is the limited amount of 
information the secret service incorporates into its official notifications (De Jongh 2015).   
The Dutch local person-specific intervention could be classified as a combination of 
the so-called community targeted - and community focused approach to counter violent 
extremism (Spalek 2012). On the one hand professionals involved in the multidisciplinary 
case conferences share information and monitor subjects, whereas on the other, cooperation 
between public authorities and communities is emphasised. The latter takes account of the 
complexity relating to the context of the person deemed a risk. Across the globe programmes 
aimed at countering violent extremism often stress the need for individual or hand tailored 
measures and community resilience (Mastroe & Szmania 2016). Although the broad Dutch 
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approach includes community focused initiatives such as the SMN, an umbrella organization 
for Dutch-Moroccans, radicalization helpline, as well as state-funded de-radicalization 
initiatives and family support units, in contrast to many other programmes countering 
(violent) extremism, the local person-specific intervention is government-led and not a 
specifically community-based (Feddes, Mann & Doosjes 2015; Ministry of Security & Justice 
2015). In the operationalisation phase it may or may not include people who are from the 
local community or who know the potential extremist personally. This in contrast to other 
programmes targeted at countering violent extremism such as, an American community-based 
programme developed by the World Organization for Resource Development and Education 
and Muslim-led or the Muslim Council of Wales’ Prevent programme. These involve 
religious representatives or peers who fulfil key roles in local implementation (Sheikh, Sarwar 
& King 2012; Williams, Horgan & Evans, 2016). 
 
Local professionals’ experiences 
 
In this section we reconstruct how local professionals - in practice - set up municipal 
procedures, deal with raising awareness and interpreting signs and the network, in order 
define the details of person-specific interventions and deal with (violent) extremism. All the 
respondents we interviewed stated that signs of radicalisation and extremism had been 
observed or reported within their municipality or region. The primary focus in this area is on 
religious extremism. In the two priority municipalities, which receive extra financial support 
and expert advice from the central government, there are known cases of people travelling to, 
and returning from, conflict zones - approximately ten cases in each municipality. The 
respondents also referred to dozens of cases in which signs of radicalisation have been noted 
and some individuals have been identified as potential travellers to conflict zones. In one of 
these municipalities, a criminal youth gang was radicalised a few years ago, and many of its 
members left for conflict zones within a short space of time.  
The non-priority municipalities have fewer signs of radicalisation, or known or 
potential cases of people travelling to conflict zones or returning from them or other cases. 
However, four respondents10 did note signs and cases causing concern. Almost every 
                                                 
10 Municipal officials 5, 6, 7 and the police officer. 
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municipality has had some dealings with one or more persons travelling to, or returning from, 
a conflict zone. They also reported signs of possible radicalisation among young people, a 
certain retreat into isolation among Salafist and certain other Islamist movements and 
societies, and the establishment of an association believed to have links to religious 
extremists. Such signs are generally reported either by partner organisations or key figures 
within the municipality or in an official report of the secret service.  
 
Raising awareness and interpreting signs of extremism 
 
All municipal authorities have invested in raising awareness of religious extremism over the 
past few years. They have held theme-based discussion days, lectures and presentations to 
inform municipal councils, internal staff, partner organisations, and key figures in the 
municipality. In addition, local professionals who are frequently confronted with these issues 
attended a three-day training course to deepen their knowledge. People who work ‘in the 
street and at the desk’ attended a one-day course. ‘It is important for people to learn to 
recognise certain signs’, observed one respondent, ‘and also to learn what are not signs, and 
not to be afraid of everything’.11 All the respondents agreed that properly interpreting signs is 
a specialist task. This is corroborated by studies of the problems regarding the identification 
and interpretation of signs of radicalisation. There are no standard patterns or standard sets of 
indicators for radicalisation and extremism. This makes the task of identifying and 
interpreting signs a difficult one (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Horgan 2010; Schmid 2013; 
Schuurman & Eijkman 2015). 
Municipalities frequently rely on the help of experts with a profound knowledge of 
Islam, many of whom have a Muslim background themselves.12 All municipal officials said 
that they were under no illusion that they possessed sufficient knowledge or expertise to talk 
about such issues and emphasised the importance of experts to help interpret signs. Such 
experts are in short supply, however.13 Nevertheless, the respondents did believe that the 
process of raising awareness had helped them to pick up more signs and gain more insight 
                                                 
11 Municipal official 4. 
12 Noted by municipal officials 2, 3, 4, 7 and CSP employees 1 and 2. 
13 Municipal officials 2, 3, 4 and CSP employees 1 and 2. 
  
 
 
Eijkman & Roodnat: Local Professionals on Person-Specific Interventions to Counter 
Extremism 
186 
into radicalisation and into religious and cultural differences, and that front-line professionals 
are now better able to find each other when needed. 
 
Local procedures after identification 
Respondents from all municipalities but one14 stated that person-specific interventions 
had been devised in response to distinct needs. Signs were picked up and action had to be 
taken. In the priority municipality this had happened in or around 2012-2013, while in most of 
the non-priority municipalities it had happened later. All respondents indicated that one or 
more cases had occurred within the municipality or region, in response to which interventions 
had been initiated using a multidisciplinary approach. This approach specifically targets 
religious extremism rather than any other form of extremism. Many municipalities adopted 
this approach in response to a distinct need, having observed signs of religious extremism. 
When such signs are reported, local officials start by gathering information internally and 
making an initial assessment.  
The person-specific response is scaled up if there is any possibility that the signs are 
indicative of (violent) extremism or terrorism. The signs are then discussed and considered in 
a case conference.15 All municipalities have set up multidisciplinary case conferences to 
discuss signs of this nature, as recommended by central government, but these conferences 
operate in different ways from one municipality to the next. However, as mentioned before, 
the so-called priority municipalities receive extra support from central government, both 
financially and in terms of knowledge and expertise. As they deal with more cases, there is 
wide appreciation of the need and usefulness of this approach. These municipalities have 
more experience with person-specific interventions and possess the necessary capacity to 
manage the practicalities of implementation. Regular forms of consultation foster greater 
cooperation. This is harder for smaller municipalities to achieve, as a result of which they try 
to forge cooperative relationships with larger and priority municipalities. Such relationships 
have not yet been built up in all parts of the Netherlands - something that may impede the 
local integrated approach. 
                                                 
14 Municipal official 4. 
15 Municipal officials 1 to 7. 
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Local networks and cooperation 
 
All respondents agreed on the importance of maintaining a good network: not only relations 
with their partner organisations in the approach, but also with key figures and local 
professionals who have close ties with the community, who are in a position to pick up 
relevant signs, and who can present an accurate picture of new developments. It is important 
to continue to invest in the network, and the respondents do so by arranging for partner 
organisations to meet each other and exchange information and to determine a carefully-
considered, joint course of action. The network of ‘people in the street’, such as youth 
workers and community police officers, is crucial both to information-gathering and to 
appropriate intervention.16 
One region has a network coordinator who is specifically concerned with the theme of 
(violent) extremism and individuals and groups deemed to pose a high risk. The network 
coordinator maintains close ties with the local community and key figures. This individual not 
only works in response to specific incidents, but also maintains a network of contacts and 
conducts preventive talks with people in the surrounding area. The latter includes not only 
worried parents and other concerned members of the public, but also individuals who have 
reportedly exhibited signs of radicalisation. A network coordinator has a wider range of 
operation than local professionals working in particular communities or regions.17 Youth 
workers and community police officers are important to the network and frequently have good 
access to the community and.18  
On the whole, the respondents expressed satisfaction with the cooperation they receive 
with partners in the approach. Adequate mutual trust is an important condition for 
information-sharing. Structural consultations help to build this trust. Four of the respondents 
noted that they sometimes had problems relating to information-sharing. This was particularly 
the case in regions that did not have structural consultations. Each partner organisation takes 
part with a different objective and people are not always used to sharing information 
externally. In addition, several respondents reported a certain dissatisfaction with the 
information provided by the AIVD. The official secret service reports they receive are often 
                                                 
16 Municipal officials 1, 2, 6, 7 and police officer. 
17 Comment by CSP employee 1. 
18 Municipal officials 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
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uninformative. The respondents appreciate that it is not always possible to supply more 
information, but this can hamper their ability to make well-founded decisions - especially 
since the municipal authority is responsible for coordinating the local approach and in some 
cases a particular intervention plan has already been set in motion. This lack of information 
from the partners at national level has already been noted in earlier research (De Jongh 2015). 
 
Preventive or repressive interventions? 
 
All the respondents stated that they had launched interventions as part of the effort to tackle 
(religious) extremism. These ranged from criminal law and administrative measures to 
supervision in care strategies and other preventive interventions. When we asked them about 
the effect of interventions, the CSP employees said that this was hard to answer, since each 
intervention was different: ‘Each one is a carefully-considered combination of interventions 
and partners deemed appropriate to the specific case’. All the respondents confirmed this: 
each response is tailored to the individual circumstances (Coolsaet 2016). This weighing of 
possible interventions and tailor-made responses is also used in tackling other kinds of crime. 
The importance of the context of each case is often emphasised (Menger & Krechtig 2016). In 
some cases it may be ‘strategically convenient’ to refrain from certain interventions, such as 
discontinuing someone’s unemployment benefit. Keeping communication channels open and 
attaching conditions to certain advantages may make it easier to keep track of someone and to 
stay in contact with them.19 The choice of intervention strategy and partners will depend on 
many factors: the degree of extremism, the person’s environment and social circumstances 
and the degree of access that local professionals have to the person concerned. 
The respondents insisted that there was no standard set of interventions that can be 
applied to a particular target group. The measures listed in the AIJ plan of action do not 
transform the person-specific approach, as currently used to combat religious extremism, into 
something completely different from the regular person-specific approach as pursued by the 
CSP.20 Officials draw from the available stock of options. Meanwhile, this stock is constantly 
                                                 
19 Municipal official 6. 
20 It is already common practice within the CSPs to collaborate with partners in the criminal justice system, care 
services, and municipal partners and authorities, to tackle nuisance, domestic violence and crime arising from a 
complex set of problems. To tackle these problems, it is common to impose care-related measures, combined 
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being expanded and tightened up with new measures.21 Most of the respondents said that they 
felt that they had gained a better picture of the problems and of those involved since 2012. 
Although it is true that there is always a degree of uncertainty involved, this was the 
respondents’ stated experience. In addition, they said they had noted some positive effect, 
provided the interventions were carried out correctly and the cooperation with partner 
organisations worked well. 
In general, the respondents singled out preventive interventions as the most effective. 
Examples included supervision and having a robust network of key figures to provide 
opposing views - at least, where such interventions were appropriate to the circumstances. 
The police and OM respondents likewise underscored the importance of preventive action and 
supervision plans. It is important to improve the social circumstances of those concerned 
precisely because such cases are often greatly influenced by social and economic factors, such 
as employment, prospects, and social context (Coolsaet 2016). The police and OM 
respondents emphasised the importance of preventing matters escalating to the stage of 
criminal proceedings. Their perception is that if someone is still in the early stages of the 
radicalisation process, a conversation with an expert or key figure may achieve a great deal. It 
is crucial, however, that this expert is conversant with the person’s religion and milieu, that he 
or she can build up a relationship of trust, and that the person concerned is interviewed and 
not interrogated.22 Several studies have focused on the use of key figures and on efforts to 
engage with radicalised individuals or extremists. The results have been variable, depending 
on the context. It is important to avoid taking action that ends up stigmatising a specific 
section of the population, or merely uses them to gain intelligence (De Jongh 2015; 
Vermeulen 2014; Vermeulen & Bovenkerk 2012; Sieckelinck & De Winter 2015; Thomas 
2010). Nonetheless, one also needs to guard against seeing all those involved as victims: some 
may be potential perpetrators, adds one of the respondents.23 
However much care has been taken, an atmosphere of unrest frequently develops in 
the surroundings, which calls for a constructive response. The primary focus at such times is 
                                                                                                                                                        
where necessary with criminal-law measures (http://www.veiligheidshuizen.nl/achtergrond#.WBR-PuCLS00, 
accessed on 1 November 2016).  
21 CSP employees 1 and 2. 
22 Municipal official 2. 
23 Municipal official 4. 
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on schools and mosques and on finding ways of reassuring and informing pupils and 
visitors.24 However, a respondent from one municipality said that the schools and mosques 
you would want to reach are precisely those that are not receptive to preventive action of this 
kind.25 After all, there may often be a lack of trust, or concern that information may end up 
with the intelligence and security services (De Jongh 2015). One important target group 
consists of those who are left behind when their friends or relatives travel to conflict zones. It 
is imperative to keep close contact with these friends and family members. This helps provide 
more information, ensures the prompt notification of a person’s return, and makes it possible 
to watch for any signs of radicalisation of the person’s brothers and friends, for instance. 
When someone travels to a conflict zone, it has an enormous impact on that person’s family, 
school, and neighbourhood in all instances (Weggemans, Bakker & Grol 2014). This is often 
picked up by the media and the suffering is exacerbated by repeated news reports. This may 
also lead to greater polarisation, since people in the surrounding neighbourhood may turn 
against the person’s friends and family.26 
When it comes to administrative measures such as the revoking of a passport, the 
respondents expressed different views. Three of them believed that the passport measure has a 
useful disruptive effect, since it creates an extra barrier making it harder to leave the 
country.27 But others said that someone who was determined to leave would be able to do so 
even without a passport, and did not see any added value in the passport measure.28 In fact 
one municipal respondent thought that the measure attracts more attention to the case. If the 
security & justice minister imposes this measure, the partner organisations appear to take the 
case more seriously and to ‘become more active’.29 Another point that was raised was the 
difficulty of proving that someone plans to travel to a conflict zone and is not simply going on 
holiday. 
The national financial sanctions measure is a complex and exceptional measure.30 It is 
extremely important to apply it in the right way. Experience with this measure has shown it to 
                                                 
24 Municipal officials 1 and 2. 
25 Municipal official 6. 
26 Municipal officials 1 and 2. 
27 Municipal official 1, police officer and OM policy officer. 
28 Municipal officials 3, 4 and 6. 
29 Municipal official 5. 
30 CSP employees 1 and 2 and OM policy officer. 
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be effective when applied to people who are fighting in a conflict zone. It helps to guard 
against the Netherlands financing the conflict. However, when people return home, the 
measure may have a negative effect, since it hampers integration and fills them with a sense 
of exclusion that actually strengthens their radical views.31 This conclusion has been 
confirmed by study among ex-detainees (Weggemans & De Graaf 2015). In addition to this, a 
substantial number of people travelling to conflict zones have a criminal past (Coolsaet 2016). 
So the financial sanctions measure actually encourages them to ‘find other sources of 
income’.32 
Municipal authorities often look for administrative grounds for ‘soft’ interventions. 
These grounds relate primarily to the kinds of support that authorities can offer in relation to 
housing, daytime activities, benefit, personal supervision, and other types of (care) 
counselling. Attaching conditions to support like this makes it possible to remain in close 
contact with the person and to require something in return. This can help a person devote his 
or her energy to building up a meaningful way of life and finding useful ways of spending 
their time, for instance by looking for a job or signing up for an education - or skills training 
course. ‘The local authority’s rule of thumb is to take soft measures when possible and hard 
action when necessary’.33 This approach seeks to avoid possible triggers for radicalisation, 
such as a feeling of social exclusion and a form of identity crisis and distrust of the authorities 
(Barlett, Birdwell & King 2010). 
In summary, all respondents stated a preference for preventive and ‘soft’ measures 
rather than measures taken under the criminal law. However, if someone is far advanced 
along the path of radicalisation, more repressive interventions may be necessary.34 The main 
effects of these “hard” measures are to disrupt and monitor and to remove any danger that 
may be posed to society. The OM policy officer stated that using the criminal law was 
something that should not be done only as a last resort but more importantly as the ‘best 
resort’: in other words, ‘how can we best use the criminal law, along with other interventions, 
to achieve the desired effect?’ Politicians often call for tough action: ‘in national politics, 
prevention does not have a sexy image’. However, according to this respondent’s experience, 
                                                 
31 CSP employees and OM policy officer. 
32 OM policy officer. 
33 Municipal official 2. 
34 CSP employees and OM policy officer. 
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tough action and criminal-law measures are less effective than a combination of ‘softer’ 
interventions.  
 
A learning curve  
 
However as one respondent mentioned in relation to devising hand-tailored interventions, ‘it 
remains an area that comes with a learning curve, one that calls for a pioneering approach’.35 
This means that people need to be confronted with cases on a regular basis in order to learn 
from them. Some of respondents do not see many cases, and as a result they may lack the 
knowledge and expertise that is needed to continue shaping this developing approach. In 
addition, capacity has to be freed up to allow people to devote themselves regularly to 
studying cases. This too is hard to achieve in practice, particularly in municipalities that do 
not have many cases. Another side-effect is that it is not only the officials who are on a 
learning curve; the subjects are learning too: ‘they get smarter all the time and keep finding 
new ways of staying below the radar or evading interventions’.36 
In the process of an intervention it is important to set realistic goals and to adopt a 
realistic view of the situation. That means distinguishing between what is desirable and what 
is possible - to ‘prevent disappointment and discouragement’.37 For instance, it is not a 
realistic objective to disengage the leading figure of an extremist movement, since this 
person’s radicalisation is probably too far advanced. All respondents confirmed this view and 
said that they were under no illusion that they could de-radicalise heavily extremist 
individuals. The literature likewise refers to the limits of what can be achieved in terms of de-
radicalisation (Koehler 2016). Disengagement is seen as a more realistic goal, which can be 
successful in the case of individuals whose radicalisation is less far advanced (Barrelle 2014; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013; Horgan 2009/2010; Sieckelinck & De Winter 2015). 
In the case of someone whose radicalisation is far advanced, the goal might be to 
monitor him and to prevent him from disseminating his radical ideology when setting realistic 
goals. This will involve following the person in his or her development and intervening or 
adopting different measures when necessary. The respondents added that the most important 
                                                 
35 CSP employees 1 and 2. 
36 Municipal official 1. 
37 CSP employee 1. 
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consideration here is to protect society.38 This must be done as early as possible if the 
objective is to prevent radicalisation or to achieve a person’s disengagement from radical 
ideology. There will be a higher chance of success in case conferences where those concerned 
can still be encouraged to break away from radical circles. This is not always possible and is 
not always a realistic goal.39 
 
Side-effects 
 
The above observations suggest that person-specific interventions may also have side-effects. 
This applies not only to the interventions themselves, but also to the way in which they are 
applied.40 Amongst others, the deployment of too many interventions within a short space of 
time may be counter-productive with all the available ammunition being used up at once. For 
instance, it may be unwise to set up a wide range of support measures at once instead of 
starting off with just one form of support. Doing too much at once leaves no options to be 
explored, and if the approach fails, there is no path left to pursue. All the respondents agreed 
that taking preventive action at the same time as deploying criminal law interventions will not 
have the desired effect, and may indeed have a negative impact such as a willingness to 
cooperate with local professionals. They also agreed that it was unwise to start off with a 
heavy-handed approach. For instance, in the case of a young girl, starting immediately to talk 
about the possibility of travelling to a conflict zone and setting up measures to prevent this 
may go too far and prove counterproductive.41 The intervention should be kept as low-key as 
possible, if the case lends itself to this approach, and should focus more on the specific 
individual. This means working in a measured way and constantly weighing the options. This 
will also provide a better picture of the effects of interventions. It is not always possible to 
predict the side-effects attached to the risks of potential extremism,  
When asked about their experience with the detention of extremist, the respondents 
expressed different, in some cases ambivalent, views. A similar ambivalence emerges from 
research, which concludes that it is difficult to strike the right balance between the high level 
                                                 
38 CSP employees 1 and 2 and OM policy officer. 
39 CSP employees 1 and 2. 
40 CSP employees 1 and 2. 
41 CSP employees 1 and 2. 
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of security in terrorist wings and resocialisation efforts (Veldhuis, Gordijn, Lindeberg & 
Veenstra 2011). On the one hand, the respondents considered it necessary in some very high-
risk cases to remove someone from society for a while.42 On the other hand, they also spoke 
of the side-effects of detention. For instance, confinement to a closed institution can aggravate 
a person’s existing isolation. One respondent cited the example of a girl who was placed in a 
closed youth detention centre.43 Support staff in the institution could not gain sufficient access 
to her, and after this period of detention she appeared to be more alienated from society and 
her extremist ideas had grown stronger. The OM policy officer stated that it was also 
important to think carefully about where to place the detainee, to prevent people with similar 
extremist ideas ending up together and reinforcing these ideas. All in all, the respondents 
concluded that it was not the case that ‘people came out of detention having been de-
radicalised’. A study of ex-detainees also found that in some cases the detention had increased 
their sense of frustration and strengthened their radical ideas (Weggemans & De Graaf 2015). 
Overall, local professionals emphasised their responsibility in designating an 
individual or group as posing a risk to society, and were adamant that no one should 
unjustifiably be branded a terrorist, extremist, or radical. Essentially they were keen to avoid 
any form of anticipatory justice. The importance of protecting national security leads to forms 
of intervention that are determined more by the potential risk than by an actual or potential act 
of extremism (Amoore & De Goede 2012; Beck 1986; Hirsch Ballin 2012; Lomell 2012; Van 
der Woude 2010). Attaching the label ‘high risk’ to a person’s name may have far-reaching 
consequences, including public sanctions lists and intrusive media coverage. Knowing this, 
local professionals pay particular attention to interpreting the risks posed by particular 
individuals or groups, to ‘daring to cross someone’s name off the local lists’ and to the 
privacy of those concerned. The professionals were clear the information should only be 
shared when it was really necessary. Public safety always has to be weighed against the 
privacy of the person concerned. It remains debatable, of course, whether this particular 
weighing of interests should be carried out in this way (Asworth 2007; Lomell 2012). One 
alternative might be to assess the violation of privacy in its own right, rather than weighing it 
against the interests of protecting public safety. 
                                                 
42 Municipal officials 1 and 5, police officer and OM policy officer 
43 Municipal official 7. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this article we explored the effect of person-specific interventions to counter (religious) 
extremism. As discussed the implementation of person-specific interventions is an important 
pillar in dealing with terrorism in Europe and elsewhere. Although portrayed as a politically 
neutral policy based on expert knowledge, hand-tailored interventions in the Dutch case study 
are in fact ‘works in progress’. Municipal authorities have been designated an important task 
in the interest of national security and maintaining public order. Yet, what this means in 
practice or what its effect is from the local professional perspective is something that has 
received modest attention from academics and policymakers’ attention. Therefore, our aim in 
this exploratory study was to contribute to debates on the effect of dealing with (violent) 
extremism locally.  
We found that each of the local professionals we interviewed implemented the person-
specific interventions in their own way within the framework of national policy. Potentials 
signs of violent extremism are assessed and interpreted in local multi-disciplinary case 
conferences. If necessary, an intervention strategy is devised and tailored to the specific 
situation. The key factors here are a solid network, an expert in interpreting signs, not too 
many concurrent measures, more a preventive - rather than a repressive focus, good inter-
institutional cooperation and information-sharing, all of which appear easier to achieve in so-
called priority municipalities than elsewhere. From the perspective of local professionals 
involved person-specific interventions have had some effect in countering religious 
extremism. According to them it has helped provide a better picture of the problem within 
their municipalities and high-risk individuals are now monitored more effectively. Local 
professionals, however, emphasised the importance of setting realistic goals: for instance, 
monitoring persons who already have extremist ideas instead of setting the unattainable goal 
of de-radicalising them. Monitoring them can serve a useful purpose, making it possible to 
potentially disrupt certain activities if the need arises.  
Each intervention must be tailored to the person concerned. Interventions have to be 
evaluated and always weighed against one another and against the context. The interviewees 
considered that preventive measures such as supervision were the most effective kinds of 
intervention, provided they were appropriate to the context. They also spoke of the side-
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effects: the simultaneous use of preventive - and repressive measures may have the opposite 
effect to that desired and the responsibility of labelling an individual as posing a risk to 
society. Despite this call for caution before intervening, it appears as if their primary concern 
is obtaining information as well as assessing specific situations from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. This consequently suggests that from a national security perspective this form of 
prevention primarily targets potential extremists and groups, thereby emphasizing 
information-gathering, monitoring and involving stakeholders for disengagement, rather than 
widespread community involvement.  
Furthermore, despite the central role that municipal authorities play in countering 
(violent) extremism policies they run up against problems such as their cooperation with the 
security - and care sector. The basic principle is that the local professionals with whom 
information is shared are selected strategically, and that each person bears a professional 
responsibility for dealing with that information in all confidentiality. Moreover, information 
can only be shared if it is essential from a national security perspective. But what does that 
mean to a local professional who is operating from the care services perspective? These are 
responsibilities of local authorities at the interface of care and national security. How can 
authorities ensure that subjects relating to diverse areas are embedded in policy and procedure 
across the board? And even if they do so: are they human rights proof? Is this even feasible? 
Could it work with a broad integrated approach to dealing with (violent) extremism and 
terrorism, or is this by its nature mainly about taking action in response to incidents?  
The article’s findings have some obvious limitations, including that the interviews 
were processed anonymously at the respondents’ request. The desire for anonymity is a 
common problem affecting studies of terrorism and (violent) extremism (Schuurman & 
Eijkman 2013; Silke 2001). This may impede efforts to check that the conclusions have not 
been falsified (Schuurman, Eijkman & Bakker 2015). Furthermore, although the authors are 
not affiliated with the Dutch government and the research was self-funded, there is a potential 
bias problem. Primarily, because the experience of the individuals who are targeted in the 
person-specific approach fell outside the scope of this study, thereby excluding potential 
critical reflection on the effect of the intervention. For this reason, we collated the qualitative 
data with existing research and the existing literature wherever possible. 
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